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MARITIME LIENS.
I.-LIEN OF THE SHIP ON THE CARGO.
Maritime law, and the principles of which it is constitate&. are.
not composed of doubtful opinions, or fanciful and unsettled systems,.
Some of its regulations rest on positive adjudications; others, 'on
usages established among nations from necessity, the utility of
which has been demonstrated by a lengthy and satisfactory expe-
rience. The right of lien is one of those commercial regulations
which are founded on manifest justice and comprehensive utility,
and is a privilege which the law takes under its special protection.
The right of the common carrier to retain the goods committed to
his care, for the freight due thereon, most probably had its origin
in the necessities of primary commercial intercourse,, though sub-
sequently abundantly ratified by direct authority, and now uni-
versally acknowledged as a principle of common law, which entitles
a party who is compelled to receive and transport the goods of
another, to retain them for his indemnity.'
As far back as the authorities upon this subject lead us, we find
the acknowledgment of this doctrine of retention for the satisfac.
I Smith's Mercantile Law, 535.
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tion of legitimate claims, with the further assurance that it had
been exercised for years.' It is thought we may safely assume
that the general proposition, that the owner of a ship has a lien on
the goods in his possession for the freight due under the contract
of shipping, has never been questioned. It has received the sane-
* tion and support of an unbroken series of decisions, until now the
general rules of the common law concerning liens are well settled.
In consideration of the duties and liabilities imposed upon persons
engaged in certain business, or on account of the usages of trade,
the law recognizes in those whose expenditures or services have
contributed to enhance the value of the property of others in their
hands, the right to retain the possession of that property, until
compensation has been made for their labor and consequent advance-
ment of value.,
This privilege of retaining possession of the cargo, until freight
was discharged, appears to have been allowed by the maritime codes
of Europe. - By the civil law, as well as by those -of Oleron, the
lading of the ship is subject to detention not only for the freight,
but for the primage and average due in respect of it. A like privi-
,lege was given by the marine ordinance of France, and according.
1to the present acceptation of commercial law, whether the ship be a.
.chartered or a general one, the master need not relinquish the posses.,
:sion of any part of the cargo, until the freight and charges due on
its account are discharged.
It may be. stated in beginning, that freight only becomes due at
,the common law, for the regularly bringing of the goods to the place
-of destination, pursuant to the stipulations of the contract of ship-
)ping, and only under such circumstances can the claim of lien be
:attached to the cargo. The shipper may, however, waive by an
)independent agreement, the furtherv prosecution of the voyage and
receive the goods at an intermediate port, and then a lien exists
-for the amount specified irl the special contract.8 As we have before
:said, the right of lien, is thle right of retaining possession of certain
1property, till ybur claim4 against it is discharged.4 The fact of
12 Ld. Raym. 752. 11t0 Conn. 104.
53 Sumn. 542. 44 Johns. Ch. 582; 20 Johns. 611.
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retention, implies of necessity, a previous lawful and legitimate
,possession, and of course this privilege can only be exercised when
the owner of a vessel has possession and control of his ship himself,
for then only does he have constructive possession of the goods on
board, so as to justify a claim for lien.' The owner is entitled to
detain any part of the merchandise for the freight of all that is con-
veyed on account of the same person, for he only lessens, and does
not destroy or conclude his security by delivering up any part of
it.2  "The lading of the ship," says Molloy, "is in construction of
law, tacitly.obliged for the freight, the same being in point of fact,
preferred to any other debts to which the goods so laden are liable.
Even though such debts are precedent to the freight, for the goods
remain, as it were, bailed for the same; not are they subject to
attachment in the master's hands, though vulgarly is conceived other-
wise." 
3
As the right of detention is only intended for the better security
of those who perform services or incur expenses in respect of
property in their hanids, such person may limit or waive this right
by virtue of a special contract. This lien has grown out of the
usages of trade, and does not exist, and cannot be enforced when
waived by inconsistency.' If personal credit is given or another
and an independent security is taken, for the payment of that debt
for which the party has a lien, by such conduct the lien is vacated.,
If the ship owner claims possession of the goods for reasons different
from his lien, he will be considered as having abandoned that
security, and the goods will be discharged from the claim. 6 A right
of lien is not however determined by an alteration in the ownership
of the goods over which it is exercised, after the claim has once
attached.7 When the price of transportation is refused when ten-
dered, or if in the absence of such tender, the ship owner has refused
to deliver the goods upon payment of just freight, the possession
becomes tortious, and the lien is lost.8  As continuance of possession
'4 Mass. 91; 6 Id 422; 11 Id. 72, 145; 1 Hall, 855.
6 East, 622; 3 Duer, 224.
s De Jure Maritimo, B. 2, C. 4, S. 12; 6 M. & W. 36.
4 18 Johns. 157. 2 Bing. N. C. 755. 2 Bing. 28.
79 Bing. 574. 9 M. & W. 67.5; 7 Id. 288.
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is indispensable to the existence of this right, an abandonment of
the custody of the matter over which this right extends, operates as
an absolute waiver of the lien, for in such cases the holder yielding
up the security which the lien afforded, trusts alone to the shipper's
personal responsibility.'
In case of charter-parties it often becomes a question of great
moment to ascertain whether the terms and stipulations of that
instrument are or are not inconsistent with the existence of a lien,
for it is well settled that the owner of a vessel may by special con-
tract relinquish his lien on goods carried under a bill of lading, or
he may entirely divest himself of his rights and liabilities as owner,
and by a charter-party demise them to another. As the benefit of
this claim was originally designed for the protection of those who
had entered into no agreement for the payment of freight, but
relied exclusively on their common law rights, it was formerly
considered that whenever a contract wa entered into on that subject,
there could be no lien.2 This opinion was however controverted by
high authority, and it was decided that the existence of a special
contract between a common carrier and his employer concerning
the services to be performed, and the compensation to be rendered,
does not deprive the former of his privilege of lien, unless there is
something in that contract inconsistent with such lien. 3 It is need-
less perhaps, to say that the courts will favor and enforce the lien
unless there plainly appears a relinquishment of such security by
the owner of the vessel.4 In truth, the doctrine once so broadly
asserted by the English courts, that by any charter-party, the rights
and duties of the owner were suspended, and the charterer became
owner pro hoc vice; that the owner had thereby parted with the
possession and control of the ship and cargo, and of necessity could
exercise no lien, has been much qualified and defined by subsequent
decisions.5 Now, all the authorities upon this subject acknowledge
the right of the vessel's owner to retain the goods of the charterer
for the sum due by the terms of the charter-party, unless he has
1 1 Atkyn, 234; 1 Mo. & R. 252. 2 Sayer, 224; Buller's N. P. 45.
S 5 M. & S. 180; 10 Conn. 104. ' The Volunteer, 1 Sumn. 551
6 Crosson Lien, 301; 7 Taunt. 14.
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expressly and totally demised the possession of the ship to the
occupier himself.' Whether the possession of a vessel and the
accompanying privileges are thus designed to be given up and
transferred to another, is a matter to be ascertained and determined
by the intention of the parties as manifested in the terms of the
charter-party, and by the actual circumstances of each case. The
exposition of its opinion by our Supreme Court is at once clear and
comprehensive. It holds, "that when the general owner retains
the possession, command and navigation of his ship, and contracts
to carry a cargo on freight for the voyage, the charter-party is a
mere affreightment sounding in covenant. The owner does not
transfer, but retains his character and legal privileges of ownership,
and among them his right to retain the cargo for the satisfaction of
his claims under the agreement." 2
The Admiralty Courts of Great Britain, on account of an alleged
want of jurisdiction, refuse to enforce a lien on the cargo other than
for freight due, and will not permit a retention for breach of the
conditions of a chartei-party, such as those concerning dead-freight,
demurrage &c.3 Our courts, adopting a more discerning public
policy, have given efficacy and vitality to. that principle of maritime
law which studiously connects the interests of ship and cargo, and
creates a reciprocal responsibility between the two, for the mutual
advantage and more certain security of both.
With us there is a lien on goods laden on board the ship, for
charges advanced,4 for security on an adjustment for general
average,5 and when the whole of the ship is chartered at a specific
rate per ton, the cargo must pay for what the ship could have
carried, even though a full cargo had not been furnished.6 Indeed,
the American decisions generally, sustain the marine law to its full
extent, and agree that to every contract of shipping, whether by
bill of lading or otherwise, there is tacitly annexed the covenant
to make the cargo in specie, liable for the due performance of the
terms of the agreement, and.upon breach, lien is enforced.7
4 Cowen, 470; 8 Taunt. 280; 5 Moore, 211; 3 Bin. N. C. 17.
8 Cranch, 39; 8 Wheat, 605. 3 2 MIcriv, 401 ; 4 B. & Aid. 630.
' i rb. 305. 5 13 Maine, 357. 6 15 Job-s. 327.
7 Law Rep. 471; S Wheat. 605.
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From the magnitude of the interests often involved, it becomes a
question of considerable importance to know whether the owner's
lien for his charter-party freight covers the goods of persons who
have shipped under agreement with the charterer, and between
whom and the owner of the vessel is no privity of contract; and if
the goods so laden are liable at all, to what extent the responsibility
amounts.
The cargo of the sub-freighters is liable to retention only for the
freight which is due for the transportation of each individual con-
signment, and not for the whole amount specified in the charter-
party as the hire of the ship.1 That the ship should have a'lien on
each one of the lots of merchandise which it has conveyed, for the
amount of the .freight due for each separate lot, seems a conclusion
at once equitable and necessary. Were it otherwise, by a collusive
largain with third parties, the charterer might deprive the owner
of the vessel of the'lien, to which, as carrier for the voyage, he was
justly entitled. 2 To make the goods in 8pecie, responsible for the
freight earned by their carriage under each respective bill of lading,
cannot prejudice the interests of the shipper; for the goods are in
either case, obliged to that xtent, and there should be no preference
as to which party the freight money should be paid. But to'extend
their responsibility farther than this, would be to make the under
freighters liable for the broken covenants, and non-performance of
6 private agreement between the owner and occupier of a vessel, of
which they could know nothing; and on the other hand, would allow
the charterer wrongfully to pledge the goods of another, for the
satisfaction of his own debt.
In conclusion upon this branch of the subject which relates to the
lien possessed by the ship, it may not be improper to state, that
though the cargo itself is a security for the payment of freight, yet*
the determination of a consignment gives no liberty to the merchant
shipper, to abandon it for the freight, for the contract of shipping
does not -contain any warranty against the happening of any such
event.' In this the provisions of our maritime code coincide with
2 4 B. & Ald. 680; 4 Camp. 298.1 2 Athyn, 621. 3 3 John. 821.
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the opinions of Pothler,l and Molloy, 2 who earnestly opposed the
theory of Yalin that the cargo was the only proper fund and pledge
for the payment of the freight.
IL-LIEN OF THE CARGO ON THE SHIP.
"By custom" says Cleirac, "the ship is bound to the merchan-
dise, and the merchandise to the ship." 3 Of the two principles
embraced in the first portion of this maxim, one is drawn from the
common law, and the other from our commercial codes and maritime
usages. The one,-that the owner of a ship is responsible as a
common carrier, is not open to contestation. 4 The other,-that the
ship in specie is liable to the shipper on the undertaking in the bill
of lading,. for cargo taken on board, is less familiar in the settled
adjudications, but is now-admitted to be one of the most salutary
regulations of the maritime law.' This privilege stands upon a basis
of exact reciprocity, and the right of the shipper to consider the
ship itself as a pledge for the performance of the shipping contract
is recommended as well by the dictates of reason and justice as by
an enlarged and enlightened public policy. The condition of the
owners is not made worse by rendering the ship liable. It is imma-
terial to them whether the debt is satisfied by the sale of that, or
any other portion of their property, but it is not a matter of equal
indifference to the shipper, whether or not he is allowed to look to
the vessel itself for satisfaction, as this is not only his best, but
often will be found to be his only security. A ship is of necessity
a wanderer. She visits places where her owners are unknown or at
least inaccessible. These and other kindred characteristics of
marine commerce render it indispensable that the ship itself should
be security for those who have demands against the owners. A lien
*exists in favor of a merchant who ships goods in a vessel, against
the ship for the non-performance of the contract of transportation,
and it is a claim which our admiralty courts enforce by process in
rem. The ship is, of itself'and aside from any personal liability of
the owners, considered as a security to the person who lades goods
' Traite de charte parte, rum. 60. 2 Molloy. B. 2, C. 4, S. 12.
3 Cleirac, ut et Con. 72. 4 21 Wend, 193. 5 3 Mason, 255.
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on board of her.' Whether the vessel was under the control of the
general owner for that particular voyage, or whether he had let her
by charter-party to a third person who had entire direction and
command, makes no differ'ence as to this lien upon the vessel. The
lien is enforced not only for the total loss of the goods laden on
board, but for any damage they may sustain- through the fault or
neglect of the master, or by reason of the insuffioiency of the vessel,
rigging or crew. His remedy is not confined to an action in per-
sonam -against the owner, but the vessel is by the law merchant
hypothecated to the shipper for his damage, from the time the
"misfortune happens.2 The owner of goods shipped and not delivered
according to the bill of lading, has a lieu on the vessel for their
value.3 Fok the price of cargo sold during the voyage from necessity
it has been thought. a lien exists.4 The admiralty jurisdiction of
England, though the general existence of this lien is admitted,' deny
that any power is possessed by them to enforce such lien against
the ship in 'em, and in favor of the merchant shipper. While with
them, this useful and important principle remains unexercised and
worthless, our courts have, upon solid and 'convincing reasons,
adopted and enforced the regulations of the marine law.
By th6 general maritime law of Europe the vessel is liable only
to the value of the ship and freight for obligations arising ea delicto',
and by an abandonment of them they are dischatged. According
to Emerigon, such, besides being the modern acceptation of the ship
owner's responsibility, was the nautical law of the middle ages.'
The reason urged for such a limitation was, that a complete
responsibility teided to discourage the speedy enlargement of com-
merce. The endeavor-to thus define the liabilities of ownership in
vessels, has never Succeeded in this country.7 With the exception
of a few statutes passed by .individual States,*there is no departure*
1 3 Kent's Com. 218; Ware, 263.
2 The Rebecca, Ware, 188; 4 Law Rep. 384, 475.
3 I Blatch. & How. 300.
4 -Cons. del Mare, ohs. 105, 106; Cleirao Contrats zoarit. C. 4, art. 35, 86.
Emerigon on Marit. Loans, C. 4, J 9; C 12. J 4.
r Abb. on Ship. 126, 127. 5 1 Contrats a la Grosse. C. 4. J 11.
The Rebecca, Ware, 188; 1 Miller (Lou.) 259. 539.
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from the common law rule that the obligation incurred goes to the
whole extent of the injury sustained, whether the liability arises ex
contractu or ex delicto.
The covenant in charter-parties, whereby the owner binds the
ship, and the charterer binds the cargo for the due performance of the
terms of that instrument, is in almost universal use in the commer-
cial world. Though the right of lien for freight does not depend
upon any especial agreement to pay freight, and though our courts
have so completely carried into practice the maxim that "Le hatel
e8t oblig6 d la marchandise et la marchandise au batel" that they
tacitly annex this as a covenant to every contract for the carriage
of goods, yet it is often of consequence to ascertain what legal effect
is attached to such a clause. The English cases deny that such a
clause creates a lien for general security for the performance of the
covenants' contained in the charter-party, or that it gives either
party a right to detain for any cause which he could not have done
in the absence of such a clause.' The reason which appears to have
been most cogently firged for such a doctrine seems to be, that
because there was no active remedy by process in rem provided in
all cases, no passive remedy by way of simple lien is allowed to
either party, on account of the insertion of this binding clause into
the charter-party. In our country where the admiralty jurisdiction
is not confined within the same narrow limits,' a clause in the con-
tract of charter or transportation, whereby the parties respectively
bind thfe goods and vessel for the due performance of the covenants,
payments and agreements thereof, is held to be a valid clause. It
creates a lien on the goods for such performance and may be
enforced against the goods or ship by detention and a suit in the
admiralty.3 In the leading case of the Volunteer, (cited ante) it was
decided that such words were intended to create and reserve a lien
by specialty, and should be so interpreted; that the words are
sensible where they occur, the parties competent to contract, and
as the terms of the agreement have in the maritime law a clear and
determinate meaning, it is the duty of the courts to interpret
I 3 M. & S. 205. 2 De Lovio vs. Boit 2 Gall. 398.
3 The Volunteer, I Sumn. 551; 6 Pick. 252.
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the contract so as to secure to the parties, the very rights and
remedies which they intended to guaranty to each other.
Thus it will be seen that many of the old customs and statutes
concerning lien have been revised and improved. Profiting by the
common experience of nations and often disciplined by the tuition
of alarming emergencies, it is thought that in this change mere
innovation has been rejected, while fast hold has been laid upon all
the means of essential and permanent progress. We have in so far
advanced in the theory of international morality, and the active
observance of the rules of justice among States, that instead of being
burdened on this subject with an array of commercial usages which
form merely what Azuni termed "a chaotic mass of scholastic
disquisitions," we recognize a series of comely and universally
practical marine regulations, which though subject to various modi-
fications according to the different requirements of each nation, are
by virtue of their very.nature identical in all. Embracing, as this
branch of commercial regulations does, the greatest public and
private interests, it is imperatively necessary that amidst the circum-
stantial variety of its regulations, essential unity should still be
preserved, and that every where, the law of maritime liens should
be administered with a view to the public policy, and in the spirit
of ample and substantial justice. Of the admiralty jurisdiction of
these States, it may well be said, that they have so enlarged and
increased the once meagre and unsatisfactory privileges of lien;
have rendered their courts so easily and universally accessible, and
have above all, so throughly adapted their process and decrees to
commercial usages and wants, that now, either party may upon
application, have meted out to him almost that perfect justice,
which is aalministered "freely and without purchase; completely
and without denial; speedily and without delay."
